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ARTICLE 
THE SELECTION AND ELECTION OF CIRCUIT JUDGES IN 
MARYLAND: A TIME FOR CHANGE 
By: The Honorable Dana M. Levitz* and Ephraim R. Siff** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I magine the following: A bright lawyer with a stellar reputation is appointed to the bench. He began his career as a prosecutor, and then 
spent a few years in the public defender's office before founding a small 
civil litigation practice. He has an impeccable reputation for judgment, 
temperament, integrity, and intellect. He is well liked by members of the 
bar, as well as the judges before whom he regularly appears. He has 
excellent knowledge of the law and is always prepared. Soon after his 
investiture, this new judge begins an interesting routine. He starts 
attending breakfasts, luncheons, dinners, and assorted socials with an odd 
request. He asks his friends, associates, and anyone he meets to 
. contribute to a fund to furnish his chambers. He asks for monetary 
contributions to buy a hardwood desk, a leather chair, a computer station, 
some bookshelves, a conference table with a few chairs, and a simple 
couch. He does not intend on using the couch but thinks it would look 
nice in the office. He has his own pictures to hang on the wall, so he does 
not ask for any; however, he would accept some artwork, above and 
beyond what he initially solicited. 
An unintentional consequence of having been a trial lawyer is that 
most of his friends are trial lawyers as well. So, he goes about seeking 
out these friends for donations to his chamber fund. He knows that these 
friends will appear before him in criminal cases and civil matters. He 
knows that they will present him with motions to grant, while others will 
ask that he deny the presented motions. He knows that he is seeking 
donations from lawyers who will certainly appear before him in the near 
* The Honorable Dana M. Levitz retired as Senior Judge of the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County in December 2008. He was appointed to the court by Governor Harry R. 
Hughes in 1985. Judge Levitz received a B.A. from the University of Maryland, Baltimore 
County, and graduated cum laude from the University of Baltimore School of Law. He 
previously served as an Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Special Assistant 
United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, and Assistant State's Attorney and 
Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore County. Judge Levitz has been an Adjunct Professor of 
Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law since 1985. 
** Ephraim R. Siff, Esquire received his law degree from the University of Baltimore 
School of Law and served as judicial law clerk to Judge Levitz. Mr. Siff is a member of the 
Maryland Bar. 
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future. But he also knows that if he doesn't raise enough money to 
furnish his chambers, an unusual provision in the state constitution will 
require him to step down. 
So, this otherwise competent and qualified judge finds himself in a 
compromising position where he must solicit contributions. He resents it, 
but knows that he must do it. He knows that after fifteen years on the 
bench, another odd provision in the state constitution will require him to 
refurbish his office again, with brand new furniture. 
The judge has no intention of accepting these donations as bribes, but 
the state does not suppiy him with furnishings, and the constitution 
requires that a judge must step down if he or she cannot furnish his or her 
chambers in a satisfactory manner within two years. As uncomfortable 
with the process as he is, the judge knows that it will be worse the next 
time. For the next fifteen years, he will see these same friends as they 
practice before him. Many times, he knows that his rulings will upset 
them. He will meet other lawyers along the way; he can only hope that 
perhaps he will be able to reach out to them when he has to go through 
the process again. 
II. THE REALITY OF CIRCUIT COURT ELECTIONS 
It goes without saying that no constitution requires a judge to furnish 
an office with contributions from lawyers. If this were to occur in any 
western society, there would be an uproar for reform. As a matter of fact, 
if this were to occur in the American judiciary, the judge would probably 
be immediately sanctioned, removed from office, and possibly face 
criminal charges. Yet in Maryland, something almost as outrageous as 
this occurs every time a circuit court judge is appointed. The 
Constitution of Maryland requires it. Few lay people know about it, 
hardly any lawyers are outraged by it, and state legislators have decided, 
up until now, to leave it the way it is. 
The rigors of today' s judicial elections have -proven that open, 
contested elections do not produce the benign intentions of the process. 
Rather, they equate with the hypothetical that enticed you into reading 
this article thus far. By any standard, our system of electing circuit court 
judges in Maryland is seriously flawed and in desperate need of reform. 
To require judges to raise large sums of money from the very lawyers 
who will appear before them in contested trials is just not right. Yet, that 
is what currently happens every time a circuit court judge is appointed. 
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Ill. THE APPOINTMENT AND ELECTION PROCESS 
Judges of the circuit courts in Maryland must be elected by popular 
vote in open and possibly, contested elections in order to remain on the 
bench.1 These elections take place after the Governor appoints someone 
to fill a vacancy on the court.2 Unlike appellate judges, the appointee is 
not approved by the Senate or any other legislative body. 3 An appointee 
may be challenged in a contested election by any lawyer who resides in 
the county. This challenger does not have to have any particular 
experience as a trial lawyer or any experience in a courtroom at all. 4 A 
law degree, being thirty years of age, residency in the county where the 
position is sought, and the payment of a small filing fee 5 are the only 
requirements for any lawyer to challenge the appointed judge.6 The 
challenger is not vetted by anyone or any group before appearing on the 
ballot.7 If the challenger receives more votes in the election than the 
appointee, that challenger becomes the county's circuit court judge for 
the next fifteen years. 8 
Unlike legislators and executive branch officers, who choose a career 
in the political arena, most appointees to the circuit court have no interest 
in being politicians and fundraisers. They are interested in the law, not in 
the kinds of things that necessarily occupy the thoughts of politicians. 
Circuit court judges, like butterflies, begin their lives in one form, but 
then are transformed into something entirely different, bearing no 
resemblance to their former selves. They morph into creatures who are 
forbidden from having anything to do with politics and fundraising until 
their fifteen-year term is about to expire.9 Then, for one year prior to 
their election, they must transform into consummate politicians and 
successful fundraisers. 10 If elected, however, they are forbidden to have 
anything to do with those activities. 11 It is truly a schizophrenic 
existence. 
1 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 3 (2003). 
2 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 5 (2003). 
3 /d. 
4 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, § 2 (2003). 
5 The current filing fee for a lawyer to run for Judge of the Circuit Court is $300 in 
Baltimore City and $50 in all other counties in the State. Maryland State Board of Elections, 
Requirements for Filing Candidacy, http://www.elections.state.md.us/candidacy/ 
requirements.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
6 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 2 (2003). 
7 /d. 
8 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, § 3 (2003). 
9 See Md. Rule 16-813 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(a)). 
10 See /d. (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(b )). 
11 Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5 states, in relevant part: "A judge who is 
not a candidate for election or re-election to or retention in a judicial office shall not engage in 
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After his or her election, the judge serves a fifteen-year tem1.'2 If a 
judge dies during his or her term, resigns, or reaches the age of seventy, 
the Governor appoints a qualified individual as a seatholder until the next 
general election, at which time a successor is elected to complete a full 
fifteen-year term. 13 
At one time, judges on all Maryland courts were chosen in this 
manner. 
14 The Maryland Constitution anticipated these judicial elections 
to be contested. 15 The appointee certainly was permitted to run for a full 
term in his or her own right, but the election was open to any lawyer. 16 
The winner of the election was deemed the "successor" to the last elected 
judge and then served a fifteen-year term. 17 At a time when there were 
far fewer lawyers, and citizens actually knew the lawyers in their 
communities, this outdated system of electing judges was arguably 
appropriate. 
These contested judicial elections, however, have clearly fallen out of 
favor given the realities of our modem legal system and the number of 
lawyers in our society. 18 Today, the only manner of initial appointment 
any partisan political activity." Md. Rule 16-813 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct 
Canon 5(a)(1)). 
12 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art.lV, § 3 (2003). 
13 If the appointment is to fill a vacancy caused by the expiration of a fifteen-year term, 
the appointee must run in the first election after the vacancy occurs. See Mo. CODE ANN., 
CONST. art. IV, § 5 (2003). If the vacancy occurs by death, resignation or removal of the 
judge, the appointee runs in the first election following the one-year anniversary of the 
vacancy. ld. 
14 An amendment to the Maryland Constitution of 1867 was ratified on Nov. 2, 1976, 
removing contested elections of appellate judges in favor of continuance elections. See Act of 
May 15, 1975, ch. 551, 1975 Md. Laws 2638 (ratified Nov. 2, 1976) (codified as amended at 
Mo. CODE ANN., CaNST. art. IV,§ SA (2003)). 
15 Article 4, Section 12 of the Maryland Constitution of 1867 stated, in pertinent part: "If 
in any case of election or judges ... the opposing candidates shall have an equal number of 
votes, it shall be the duty of the Governor to order a new election." Mo. CaNST. of 1867 art. 
IV, § 21. Article 4, Section 21 of the 1867 Maryland Constitution stated, in relevant part: "If 
two or more persons shall be candidates for associate judge in the same county ... that one 
only in said county shall be declared elected who has the highest number of votes in the 
circuit." Mo. CaNST. of 1867 art. IV,§ 21. 
16 See Mo. CONST. of 1867 art. IV, § 2. 
17 See Mo. CONST. of 1867 art. IV,§ 5. 
18 The Constitutional Convention of 1967-68 and its proposed constitution did away with 
judicial elections in favor of a simpler scheme. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
MARYLAND OF 1967-1968, COMPARISON OF PRESENT CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY 
CONVENTION 174-79, §§ 5.13-.22 (Constitutional Convention of Md. 1968) (hereinafter 
"PROPOSED CONSTITUTION"). The Proposed Constitution failed but the legislature 
implemented many of its suggestions. Governor Marvin Mandel tried especially hard to 
implement such suggestions and was successful with the passage of a constitutional 
amendment creating the District Court. See Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 
1696, 1697 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (codified as amended at Mo. CODE ANN., CaNST. art. IV, 
§§ I, 2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I (2003)). By Executive Order, he implemented the proposed 
Judicial Nominating Committee, suggested by the convention. Exec. Order No. 
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to an appellate court is by gubernatorial appointment with advice and 
consent of the Senate. 19 Judges of the district courts of Maryland are also 
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, but 
unlike circuit court judges, they are not subjected to contested elections.20 
The election and appointment process of Maryland's circuit court judges 
is the last vestige of the contested elections of the past. There is no 
rational explanation for having a different system for selecting circuit 
court judges than for every other level in the Maryland Court System. 
Although the Maryland Constitution implies that an appointee filling a 
vacant seat is a mere seatholder,21 the practical result of this anomalous 
scheme is that judges of all the courts are appointed by the Governor, but 
circuit court judges have to run in open, popular, and sometimes, 
contested elections to retain their seats. 22 
IV. THE COSTS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: FINANCIAL AND OTHERWISE 
The very few benefits of contested judicial elections in the past should 
be acknowledged; however, I submit that, now, the arguments against 
such elections far outweigh any salutary effect of subjecting judges to an 
expensive political election. 
A. Qualifications and Integrity 
The Maryland Constitution mandates that judges must be "most 
distinguished for integrity, wisdom and sound legal knowledge."23 
Although one might also expect that legislators and executives should be 
distinguished for their integrity and wisdom, the Maryland Constitution 
makes no such requirement. 24 Although legislators are called upon to 
write laws, as citizen lawmakers, it would be unreasonable to require 
them to possess "sound legal knowledge."25 This is because legislators 
01.0 1.1974.23, 2 Md. Reg. 45 (1975). For a more complete discussion of successful 
amendments and implemented legislation originally suggested by the Convention, see Dan 
Friedman, Magnificent Failure Revisited, 58 Mo. L. REV. 528 (1999). 
19 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 5A(a)-(b) (2003). 
20 When the District Court was formed in 1971, it was formed with the plan of the 
constitutional convention. See Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1697 
(ratified Nov. 3, 1970). Thus, judges on the District Court are appointed by advice and 
consent, and upon confirmation, serve for a term often years. See Mo. CODE ANN., CoNST. 
art. IV,§ 41D (2003). The voters have no mechanism to accept or reject them. 
21 See MD. CODEANN.,CONST. art. IV,§ 5 (2003). 
22 See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 3 (2003). 
23 MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 2 (2003). 
24 Aside from residency, the only qualifications for delegates and senators are that they 
be of age: twenty-one years old for delegates and twenty-five years old for senators. See MD. 
CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 9 (2003). Likewise, a candidate for Governor must satisfy the 
residency requirement and be thirty years of age. See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 5 
(2003). 
25 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, § 3 (2003). 
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come from diverse backgrounds. They may be farmers, utility workers, 
medical doctors, or teachers-many have no formal legal training at all. 
The reason judges must have higher qualifications is obvious: Judges are 
required to rule on the constitutional propriety of the laws passed by the 
legislature and the enforcement techniques of the executive branch. In 
addition, settling disputes requires legal knowledge, wisdom, impartiality, 
high moral values, and keen intellect. 
This high standard to which judges are held is trivialized by the 
judicial election process, which most often results in the public voting for 
people with whom they have no familiarity. Certainly, most have no idea 
as to the relevant qualifications of the candidate for whom they vote. 
Perhaps at a time in our history when there were fewer lawyers, and the 
citizens of a county were familiar with the potential judicial candidates, 
the present system might have assured that only the most qualified 
candidates would be elected. 
While it is theoretically possible for the lay citizen to perceive wisdom 
and character, the voter is not expected to be educated as to what makes a 
candidate a qualified judge insofar as legal knowledge, judicial 
temperament, intellect, trial experience, or other subjective qualifications. 
These are characteristics that are specific to the legal profession. 26 It is 
analogous to people being asked to vote for the chief surgeon at the 
county hospital; the individual who will operate on their family should 
the need arise. How can ordinary citizens possibly know who would be 
the most skilled surgeon in a particular specialty? 
The reality is that most people have absolutely no understanding of the 
qualifications of the judges for whom they vote. Even very educated and 
informed people often know little about a judicial candidate's 
qualifications. Gender, name familiarity, perceived race of the candidate, 
and position on the ballot are much more influential than qualifications. 27 
It is argued that an elementary principle in democracy is that the people 
should appoint and be able to recall someone who sits in judgment of the 
people. On a daily basis, based on a strict construct of facts and law 
before them, judges make decisions that are unfavorable to one or another 
26 Recognizing the unique qualifications of judges, and the high stakes of incompetent 
judges, the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68 recommended a judicial nominating 
committee to recommend appointments to the Governor. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 
574-75. When that proposed constitution failed, Governor Marvin Mandel signed an 
executive order binding creating such a commission and binding himself to make 
appointments based on their recommendations. See id. at 575. Every governor since Mandel 
has signed such an order, although the composition of the nominating committees have been 
changed and, in some ways, weakened. See id. 
27 For examples of other authors arguing this point, see Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want 
to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the Moment May Decide Your Future, 18 J.L. & POL. 
643, 644 (2002); Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 
Sw. L.J. 53, 96 (1986). 
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party. Circuit court judges are not generally called upon to mediate a 
dispute in a fashion favorable to all parties, and quite often this is an 
impossible task. 
Popularity, charisma, flamboyance, and overall political connections 
contribute to the election of local officials, legislators, and executives. 
Many qualified judges are not necessarily electable by these criteria; nor 
should they be. Judges should be selected solely based on their 
"integrity, wisdom and sound legal knowledge."28 
B. Just or Popular 
Contested elections allow a dissatisfied party to wage a campaign 
against a judge for the most unjust of reasons; that is, the judge's correct 
interpretation and application of the law. Judges who make correct, albeit 
unpopular, decisions are the very judges who most benefit the public. 
Likewise, judges are often called upon to render a verdict or ruling that is 
not in accordance with the judge's own view of what a particular law 
ought to be. Unlike legislators, who can and need only defend their own 
actions and not the actions of others, judges are called upon to defend the 
actions of the legislature in non-constitutional matters, and higher courts, 
whose interpretation of the law they are bound to apply. Few voters 
would be persuaded, in the face of a sensational ruling, by the challenged 
judge's explanation that he was bound by an archaic principle or loophole 
in sloppy legislation that even members of the bar would not understand. 
To put judges in the position that they need to defend their unpopular 
rulings in order to keep their jobs, especially their decisions based upon 
laws with which they personally disagree, is detrimental to an 
independent and dignified judiciary. 29 In addition, it is simply not fair. 
C. Recall Elections Do Not Serve to Recall Judges 
An argument that contested elections provide a mechanism for recall 
is equally weak. After initial appointment, a judge runs either in the next 
election or the first election after completing one year on the bench. 30 
Thus, at a judge's first election, he could have been on the bench for as 
short as one day or as long as two years. After this initial election, the 
next opportunity to recall the judge comes when, perhaps, he or she 
stands for election after completion of a fifteen-year term.31 
Practically, the length of the judicial term makes recall a weak 
argument for judicial elections. Is recall by failing to re-elect a judge an 
28 Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 2 (2003). , 
29 The Maryland Judicial Canons state: "A judge shall not be swayed by partisan 
interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism." Md. Rule 16-813 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial 
Conduct Canon 3(8)(2)). 
30 See Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 5 (2003). 
31 See id. 
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effective mechanism to redress an unpopular decision made more than a 
decade earlier? If an individual or group feels that an appointee is unfit, 
the initial yes/no election after appointment would allow a challenge to be 
made. When a particular judge is the subject of a contested election, 
however, his highly qualified colleagues on the ballot become targets as 
well. 32 
D. Fundraising 
The fundraising efforts required to compete successfully in a contested 
election are improper by any standard. The most fundamental qualities 
that a judge must possess and maintain are integrity and neutrality. 33 It is, 
therefore, incumbent upon a judge to actively avoid impropriety and 
avoid even the mere appearance of impropriety. 34 The vast majority of 
the commentary and case law interpreting judicial canons are spent 
spelling out how a judge should avoid the appearance of impropriety. 35 
The most basic impropriety, beyond any mere appearance, is the receipt 
of financial gifts to a judge and to causes that he or she supports. It is 
impossible for any rational, thoughtful, and intellectually honest person to 
believe that receiving gifts, without which the judge would lose his or her 
job, is anything but improper, and certainly a perfect instance of the 
appearance of impropriety. Such monetary gifts to judges for financing 
their campaigns are much more significant than contributions to a judge's 
furniture fund. 36 
A district court judge raised nearly $60,000 to finance his successful 
election to the circuit court in 2000.37 In 2002, a respected attorney raised 
over $55,000 to finance his successful bid,38 and in 2006, a challenger to 
32 Because the voter is instructed to vote for the same number of candidates as vacancies 
that exist, all candidates are competing for votes. Unlike a single vacancy, challengers can 
cost votes to not only the intended target but to all who appear on the ballot with them. 
33 The Preamble to the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct reads, in relevant part: "It is 
fundamental to our legal system that our laws be interpreted by a competent, fair, honorable, 
and independent judiciary. Such a judiciary is essential to the American concept of justice." 
Md. Rule 16-813 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon, Preamble). 
34 
"A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Md. Rule 16-
813 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2). 
35 See, e.g., Md. Rule 16-813 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2) and 
accompanying commentary; In re Lamdin, 404 Md. 631, 651-52, 948 A.2d 54, 66 (2008) 
(finding that a judge's use of vulgar language in the courtroom undermined the public 
perception of the judiciary). 
36 See supra Part I. 
37 University of Maryland, Maryland Elections Center, Campaign Finance, 2000 
Campaign of Judge Robert N. Dugan, http://www.mdelections.org/campaign-finance/ 
advanced-search/contributions?acctno=Al550 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
38 University of Maryland, Maryland Elections Center, Campaign Finance, 2002 
Campaign of Judge Patrick Cavanaugh, http://www.mdelections.org/campaign-finance/ 
advanced-search/contributions?acctno=A2312 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
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the incumbent judges, raised nearly $111 ,000 in an unsuccessful bid to 
gain election to the bench. 39 
Obviously, the sitting judges had to raise comparable funds to help 
them retain their seats. Between February 2006 and May 2008, the 
Campaign Finance Account for the incumbent judges of the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore County raised nearly $400,000.4° Comparable amounts 
were raised in the preceding election cycle.41 The campaign committee 
spent close to that amount in their successful elections. 42 A review of the 
election reports showed that a vast majority of these donations came from 
attorneys who regularly appeared before the judges seeking election. 43 
E. Abbreviated Honeymoons 
Judicial elections serve as discouragement to would-be judges. 
Appointees who are focused on beginning successful judicial careers are 
at the same time facing elections. It can be argued that the first few years 
of experience are most important to the judge's evolution from advocate 
to arbiter. Having to campaign during the first few years---or even 
months---of appointment creates a rocky beginning for new judges. 
Instead of studying the new areas of the law with which they must 
become familiar, a new appointee is out most nights and weekends 
shaking hands and kissing babies at political clubs, community 
association meetings, bull roasts, charity events, or anywhere groups of 
people assemble. This schedule hampers a judge's ability to study and 
prepare for the cases over which he or she will preside. Quite frankly, in 
many cases, it affects the judge's personal life and relationships with his 
or her family. 
There are many lawyers and judges on the District Court who would, 
by all accounts, make terrific circuit court judges, but decline to seek 
appointment because of the arduous election process. Not only is there 
campaigning and fundraising to worry about, but, in a lawyer's case, if 
the appointee loses the election, he or she is without a job, having given 
39 University of Maryland, Maryland Elections Center, Campaign Finance, 2006 
Campaign of Attorney Arthur Frank, http://www.mdelections.org/campaign-finance/ 
advanced-search/contributions?acctno=A4253 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
40 University of Maryland, Maryland Elections Center, Campaign Finance, Baltimore 
County Sitting Judges Campaign Between February 2006 and May 2008, 
http://www.mdelections.org/campaign-finance/advanced-search/contributions?acctno=A4600 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
41 University of Maryland, Maryland Elections Center, Campaign Finance, Baltimore 
County Sitting Judges Campaign in the Preceding Election Cycle, 
http:/ /www.mdelections.org/campaign-finance/advanced-search/ contributions?acctno=A IS 55 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
42 See supra note 40 & 41. 
43 See supra note 40 & 41. 
48 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 40.1 
up practice to accept the judgeship.44 Government lawyers and district 
court judges might return to their previous posts, but lawyers in private 
practice do not have that security. In a matter of months, a law practice 
that has taken years to develop can be gone. Many of the most qualified 
lawyers view this as a risk not worth taking. 
F. Minority Representation 
For years in Maryland, everyone thought that the only way for 
minorities to be represented on the circuit court was through the contested 
election process. While it must be acknowledged that, in the past, this 
was the surest route to the bench for many qualified candidates, who 
would not otherwise have been appointed; however, in recent years, the 
election process has generally stifled minority representation. Many 
qualified minority candidates appointed by various governors have not 
won election to a fifteen-year term.45 It is now generally conceded that 
contested judicial elections hinder diversity on the bench rather than 
promote it. 
G. Personal Security Considerations 
Campaigning puts a sitting judge's personal safety at risk. While in 
the courthouse, significant consideration is given to the judge's personal 
security. All criminal courtrooms have armed sheriffs present. 
Additionally, when the judge decides a contested domestic case, security 
can also be present in the courtroom. Furthermore, every courtroom has 
special security alarms that will summon an immediate response at the 
touch of a button. Judges also have protected and monitored parking 
areas. They do not ride on public elevators and are encouraged to remove 
all personal information from databases that are accessible to the public. 
Their chambers are not accessible to the public. The need for this is 
obvious: Judges routinely hear cases involving serious violence-both 
civil and criminal. In some instances, the decision made by a judge in a 
contested domestic case can be even more dangerous to the judge's 
personal security than his or her decision in a criminal case. The losing 
44 Judicial canons require a judge to give up the practice of law. Md. Rule 16-813 (2009) 
(Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4(g)(l )). 
45 Rodney Warren of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Judge Alexander 
Wright of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and Donna Hill Staton of the Circuit Court 
for Howard County all were defeated by challengers to the sitting judges. See Michael 
Dresser, Black Candidate Gets 2nd Chance at Judgeship Wright is Reappointed After Defeat 
Last Year in Circuit Court Vote, BALT. SUN, Jan. 16, 2001, at IB; Andrea Siegel, Circuit 
Judge's Defeat Leaves All-White Bench; Warren Third Black Ousted; Fellow Appointee Also 
Loses; 2 GOP Attorneys Capture Spots; Election 2004; Anne Arundel, BALT. SUN, Nov. 4, 
2004, at lB. 
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party in an ugly domestic matter often holds the judge personally 
responsible. 
While judges can avoid situations that would likely expose them to 
personal contact with disgruntled litigants, judges running for election 
cannot. As stated above, judges who are running to retain their position 
in a contested election are out most nights and weekends at any event 
where they are likely to find groups of voters. While they have extensive 
security during the day, there is no security provided while campaigning. 
Often, they attend campaign events by themselves, without anyone even 
going with them. Because of general security concerns, Maryland judges 
have received special training on personal security considerations. 46 This 
training, however, did not even attempt to address the significant security 
concerns of a sitting judge's campaign. While it must be recognized that 
no judge has been harmed by an encounter with an angry litigant while 
campaigning, it is a real fear among judges. Under the current election 
system, it is only a matter of time before that fear is realized. 
H Ballot Design and Multiple Candidates 
When there is more than one vacancy, the voter is instructed to vote 
for the number of candidates equal to the number of existing vacancies. 
Assuming that three sitting judges are on the ballot, and one is the focus 
of a challenge, all three are at risk of losing the election. Very qualified 
judges have been removed from the bench by efforts to unseat others on 
the ballot.47 Another problem is that judges appear in alphabetical order 
on the ballot. In a recent election, the three sitting judges running for 
election had three challengers. 48 The incumbent judges' last names began 
with 'R', 'T' and 'W';49 they were challenged by candidates whose 
46 The Maryland Judicial Conference has held a special training session on personal 
security considerations for judges. For an overview of the Maryland Judicial Conference and 
its subcommittees, visit http://www.courts.state.md.us/mjc.html. 
47 For example in 2002, three sitting judges on the Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
ran and were challenged by a respected attorney. Election activists considered the challenge 
to be based on qualifications. The result, however, was that the challenger and the presumed 
target succeeded in winning full terms, and a judge who was on a ticket with the challenger 
ended up losing his seat as an unintended casualty. See Stephanie Hanes, Wright Finishes Last 
in Bid to Retain His Circuit Court Seat; Judge, 53, is Unseated for 2"d Time in Two Years; 
Baltimore County; Election 2002, BALT. SUN, Nov. 6, 2002, at lOB. In 1996, many pointed to 
a new judge's association with another judge on the ballot as reason for her loss to a 
challenger. See Norris West, Hill Staton Refuses to be Bitter About Loss, BALT. SUN, Nov. 10, 
1996, at4B. 
48 In 2006, Judges Gale Rasin, John Themelis and Barry Williams of the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City were challenged by Attorneys Nicholas Delpizzo and Rodney Jones and 
Judge Emanuel Brown, then of the District Court for Baltimore City. See Maryland State 
Board of Elections, Official2006 Gubernatorial Primary Election Results, Judge for Baltimore 
City, Judge of the Circuit Court Results, http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/ 
2006/results/primary/county _Baltimore_ City.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
49 Judges Gale E. Rasin, John C. Themelis, and Barry G. Williams. 
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names began with 'B', 'D' and 'J'.50 The incumbent judges ran a 
campaign to vote bottom up. 51 A newspaper article covering this election 
humorously pointed out: "Not since grade-school seating charts have last 
names been so important. "52 
The perception that voters vote for the first three candidates is not 
without merit.53 There is no political affiliation indicated for any 
candidate, and rightfully so. Perhaps a notation as to whether the judge is 
an incumbent, who was approved by the nominating commission, would 
give the voter some frame of reference as to qualification, just as political 
affiliation provides a frame of reference for candidates to other offices. 
I. Primary Elections: A Second Bite at the Apple 
To appear on the ballot in the general election, a candidate must, 
within the number of seats vacant, be the highest vote-getter in the 
Democratic or Republican Party's primary election. 54 This means that if 
there are three vacant seats, the top three vote-getters in each party appear 
on the ballot in the general election. 55 Recognizing the fact that judges 
are supposed to be apolitical, judges are allowed to run in more than one 
primary. 56 A challenger to the appointed judge may also appear on the 
primary election ballot of both parties. 57 An independent or third-partY8 
candidate, however, need not run in any primary. 59 Being nominated by 
the third-party's central committee in that county assures a place on the 
general election ballot.60 Thus, a candidate could win in both major 
50 Nicholas DelPizzo, Rodney Jones, and Judge Emanuel Brown. 
51 Julie Bykowicz, For 3 Judges on City Ballot, Primary lsn 't Easy as A-B-C, BALT. 
SUN, Sept. 9, 2009, at lA. 
52 !d. 
53 Judge Alexander Wright, then of the Baltimore County Circuit Court, Judge Donna 
Staton, then of the Howard County Circuit Court, and Judge Rodney C. Warren, then of the 
Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, all lost their seats in contested elections. Although race 
was considered a factor because the candidates were all African-American, the names of all 
three of those judges appeared after their challenger's names on the ballot. See Dresser, supra 
note 45; Siegel, supra note 45. 
54 See Mo. CODEANN.,ELEC. LAW§ 5-705 (2003). 
55 See id. at§ 5-705(b)(3)-(4). 
56 See id. at§ 5-203(b)(l). See also Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 709, 862 A.2d 
I, 8 (2004) (noting that, under Section 5-203, a judicial candidate officially registered in one 
party may be a candidate in another party's primary election, or in the primary elections of 
both parties at the same time). 
57 See Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 5-203(b)(l) (2003). 
58 The Green Party, Libertarian Party, Independent Party, and Constitutional Party are 
recognized third-parties in Maryland. Maryland State Board of Elections, How to Register, 
http://www.elections.state.md.us/voter_rcgistration/index.html#Parties (last visited Nov. 24, 
2009). 
59 See Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 5-703.l(b) (Supp. 2009). 
60 See id. at§ 5-703.l(e). 
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parties' primaries but lose in the general election to an independent or 
third-party candidate. 
J. Political Affiliation 
The strongest argument by proponents of judicial elections is the 
difficulty of gaining appointment when one is not within the Governor's 
party. Qualified candidates for the judiciary, who are members of the 
minority party, have felt that they are unable to gain appointment to the 
bench due to their political affiliation or persuasion, and an open election 
is the only means possible to assume a judgeship. 
Political affiliation should never be a factor considered for 
appointment. The Maryland Constitution sets forth on a broad scale the 
sole criteria for a judicial appointment: "[I]ntegrity, wisdom and sound 
legal knowledge."61 When political qualifications are considered in 
making an appointment, fine candidates are denied an opportunity and the 
citizens of the state are denied the most qualified judge. The very sorry 
reality is that politics undoubtedly play a role in judicial appointments. 
This is especially disturbing when a single party holds a large majority of 
offices in the state. 62 
This strong argument, however, does not justify the much higher costs 
of contested elections. If a governor abuses his constitutional duty to 
appoint qualified judges and uses that duty to make political 
appointments, he has committed a serious breach of the oath he took, 63 
and judicial elections are not going to resolve that. 
On the federal level, the President, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, appoints judges for life.64 In reality, when appellate and district 
court judges are appointed in Maryland, the Maryland Legislature gives 
very little debate to the appointments. Unlike the process in the 
Maryland Senate, vigorous debate takes place in the United States Senate 
on many judicial appointments.65 The result is that, although presidents 
61 MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 2 (2003). 
62 For example, 33 of the 47 State Senators in Maryland are affiliated with the 
Democratic Party. Maryland State Archives, Senators by Political Party, Democrats, 
http://www.msa.md.gov/msalmdmanual/05senlhtmllsendem.html (Feb. 5, 2008). 
Additionally, 104 of the 141 State Delegates in Maryland are affiliated with the Democratic 
Party. Maryland State Archives, Delegates by Political Party, Democrats, 
http://www.msa.md.gov/msalmdmanual/06hselhtmllhsedem.html (Jan. 4, 2008). 
63 See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. I, § 9 (2003) ("I will, to the best of my skill and 
judgment, diligently and faithfully, without partiality or prejudice, execute the office of 
[Governor] .... ") (emphasis added). 
64 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
65 See, e.g., Hearings on the Nomination of Sonia M Sotomayor to be Associate Justice 
to the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Ill th Cong. 
(2009); Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice to the Supreme 
Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 OOth Cong. (1987). 
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usually appoint members of their own political party or philosophical 
ideology, the debate that takes place when a radical appointment is made 
and the arduous confirmation that appointees face, temper fringe 
appointments and encourages the President to make reasonable 
appointments. Such balance of powers and the debate it creates is the 
pinnacle of the democratic process. Such a system could serve the 
citizens ofMaryland well. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Abolish Contested Elections 
The Constitutional Convention of 1967-68 recommended that, like 
appellate judges who appear on the ballot without opposition in a yes/no 
vote to continue in office, judges of the circuit courts66 be appointed with 
the advice and consent of the senate and then continue in office after a 
yes/no vote by the public.67 At the time of the convention, the Maryland 
Constitution was already amended to provide such elections for appellate 
judges.68 It is time for such an amendment to be passed for the circuit 
court judges of Maryland as well. After appointment, the judge would be 
required to appear on the ballot for continuance in office and then serve a 
ten-year term, whereupon the Governor could appoint the judge again or 
decline to do so. 
Abolishing the contested election would remove the many conflicts 
outlined above. A judge would be able to concentrate on his or her work 
and have no need to be a successful politician and fundraiser. Potential 
judges would not be dissuaded by the rigorous election process. 
Additionally, the advice and consent of the senate would create a healthy 
check on the appointments of the Governor and limit the Governor's 
ability to make radical appointments. The undignified process of having 
judges run for election does not serve the people of Maryland well. 
B. Abolish Contested Elections for Subsequent Terms 
If, however, contested elections are to remain, contested elections 
should definitely be eliminated for a judge's second fifteen-year term. A 
vote for or against continuation in office protects the public from a judge 
who has gained a reputation for being out of touch or incompetent. 
Subjecting qualified, experienced judges with a fifteen-year track record 
to another contested election discourages those experienced judges from 
seeking a second term. For proof of this statement, one need look no 
66 The proposed Constitution called the trial court of general jurisdiction the Superior 
Court. See PROPOSED CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 179 (§ 5 .22). 
67 /d. 
68 See MD. CODE ANN., CaNST. art. IV,§ 5A (2003). 
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further than the current situation in Baltimore County, where two very 
experienced and respected members of the circuit court bench have 
announced that they will retire rather than face another contested judicial 
election.69 Neither of these judges are near the mandatory retirement age 
and both have said they would definitely have stayed on the bench were it 
not for the contested election process. 70 
Judges are presently being appointed to the circuit court at a younger 
age than they were traditionally. Many judges see the judiciary as a 
career, as opposed to a place to spend time at the end of one's legal 
career. Accordingly, many judges are required to participate in more than 
one election in their judicial careers, if they choose to remain on the 
bench until the mandatory retirement age of seventy. 71 Some of these 
would-be two-term judges forgo a second term because they do not want 
to face the indignity of a second election. Unfortunately, many of these 
judges are the most serious and experienced judges in Maryland. They 
have developed a track record over their first fifteen years on the bench, 
sufficient for the public, if interested in investigating their performance, 
to make an informed decision as to their continuation in office. 
Therefore, it is difficult to understand the logic of the argument that these 
judges should be subject to a contested election. 
C. Challenging One Judge 
It should be recognized that any number of judges may run at the same 
time to retain the seat on the circuit court to which the Governor has 
appointed them. If, for whatever reason, only one judge is the focus of an 
election challenge, all the judges are at risk of losing their positions in a 
contested election. For example, if there are three judges facing election, 
and there is one challenger who campaigns on the statement that he is 
69 Judge Lawrence R. Daniels informed the Baltimore County Bar Association by email 
that he would not seek another term, stating: "As much as I enjoy my service as a judicial 
officer, I must confess I have no desire to spend the next 16 months campaigning for office." 
Danny Jacobs, Judge Daniels Won't Run for Re-Election, DAILY REC. (Bait., Md.), June 22, 
2009, at 3B. Judge John 0. Hennegan informed the Governor that he would not seek another 
term because he doesn't have a "burning desire" to campaign for another term. Danny Jacobs, 
Second Judge Opts Out of Baltimore County Race, DAILY REC. (Bait., Md.), June 26, 2009, at 
3B. 
70 Judge Daniels has 20 years of judicial experience, first on the District Court, and for 
the past seventeen years, on the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. He will not reach the 
mandatory retirement age of seventy until 2017. See Biography of Judge Lawrence R. 
Daniels, Maryland Manual Online, http://www.msa.md.gov/msa!mdmanual/31 cc/htmll 
msa11732.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). Judge Hennegan has eighteen years of 
experience on the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and, like Judge Daniels, Judge 
Hennegan will also reach the mandatory retirement age of seventy in 2017. See Biography of 
Judge John 0. Hennegan, Maryland Manual Online, http://www.msa.md.gov/ 
msa!mdmanual/3lcc/html/msall777.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
71 See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, § 3 (2003). 
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more qualified than Judge A, the voters in that election are not given the 
opportunity to vote for Judge A or the challenger; instead, the voter is 
instructed to vote for three judges. The result often is that both Judge A 
and the challenger are elected, and Judge C, who everyone agreed was 
highly qualified, loses his or her seat. 
A reasonable alternative is to place each seat up for election on the 
ballot independently. A challenger can decide which seat they are 
seeking. Essentially, the challenged judge can focus his or her attention 
on the challenger, leaving the other incumbents free from risk of losing 
their seats. The public, by its vote, expresses its opinion as to who is 
more qualified: Judge A or the challenger. 
D. District Court Judges as Candidates 
The judicial canons do not permit fundraising and political activity by 
judges unless they are candidates for judicial office. 72 This is sensible 
because the need to be elected in a contested election is a system in which 
they are forced to participate if appointed to a circuit court judgeship. 
The appearance of impropriety in fundraising is an unintended 
consequence of being forced to win an election after they are appointed. 
Conversely, district court judges are not required to run in any election. 
The only time they must fall back on the safe harbor, which allows for 
political activity and fundraising, is by declaring themselves a candidate 
for judicial election to a circuit or appellate court. 73 District court judges 
should not be able to rely on the safe harbor provisions permitting 
political activity. The appearance of impropriety caused by fundraising is 
completely of their own doing. 
If a district court judge intends to seek election to the circuit court, he 
or she should be required to resign from the bench prior to engaging in 
the campaign. Currently, district court judges are allowed to challenge 
circuit court judges appointed by the Governor without risk. Even if they 
lose the election for the circuit court, they retain their district court 
judgeship. 74 The appearance of impropriety when a sitting district court 
judge raises funds for a contested election is obvious. The impropriety of 
having one active member of the Maryland judiciary challenging another 
active member of the judiciary is equally obvious. 
72 Compare Md. Rule 16-803 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(a)) ("[a] 
judge who is not a candidate for election or re-election ... shall not engage in any partisan 
political activity"), with Md. Rule 16-803 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(b)) 
("[a] judge who is a candidate for election or re-election ... may engage in partisan political 
activity"). 
73 See Md. Rule 16-803 (2009) (Md. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(b )). 
74 See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV,§ 41D (2003). 
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E. Eliminate Party Primary Election for Judges 
Under the current system, a candidate who wins in both the 
Democratic and Republican primary could lose his or her seat on the 
bench to a candidate who did not have to run in any primary. At the same 
time, a third-party candidate would not have to spend a penny in a 
contested primary election. That third-party candidate could devote all of 
the funds raised for the judicial campaign to the general election by 
merely getting the approval of the central committee of the county for 
that party. Often this amounts to getting the approval of twenty or fewer 
voters. For instance, by the end of 2008, the Constitution Party, a 
recognized political party in Maryland, had fewer than fifteen registered 
voters in Baltimore County.75 It must be remembered that judicial 
candidates appear on the general election ballot without party 
affiliation. 76 Therefore, the public has no way of knowing whether the 
name they see on the general election ballot for Judge of the Circuit Court 
is the candidate of the Libertarian, Green, Constitution, Democratic or 
Republican Party. Since all candidates for Judge of the Circuit Court 
appear on each election ballot without party affiliation, if primary 
elections are to remain for judges, all candidates for judge should appear 
on the primary election ballot as well. This will eliminate the chance that 
a candidate could win the general election without having appeared on 
any primary ballot at all. More importantly, if the same candidates are 
the top vote-getters in all primaries, they would not have to run in a 
general election. 
F. Reform of the Judicial Nominating Commission 
With the elimination of contested judicial elections, confidence must 
be restored to the judicial selection process. Such reform was indeed 
suggested by the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68.77 The 
convention suggested a Judicial Nominating Commission that would 
recommend candidates to the Governor. 78 There was to be one 
commission for the appellate courts and one for the trial courts.79 The 
Trial Courts Nominating Commission was to be comprised of no fewer 
than six members, consisting of an equal number of lawyers and lay 
members.80 The lay members were to be appointed by the Governor and 
the lawyer members were to be elected by secret ballot by the lawyers in 
75 See Maryland State Board of Elections, Maryland Voter Registration, 2008 End-of-
Year Report, http://www.elections.state.md.us/pdf/vrar/2008 _year. pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 
2009). 
76 Mo. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW§ 5-203(b)(l) (2003). 
77 See PROPOSED CONSTITUTION, supra note 18. 
78 /d. at 176 (§ 5.15). 
79 Id. at 177-78 (§§ 5.16-.17). 
80 /d. at 178 (§ 5 .17). 
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the circuit where the vacancy existed. 81 The members would serve a term 
of years, giving them independence from the executive who appointed 
them. 82 Additionally, the Governor was required to appoint a judge from 
the candidates forwarded by the committee.83 If the Governor failed to 
appoint a candidate from the list within a given time frame, the Court of 
Appeals would make the selection. 84 The overall objective of the 
proposed formula was to de-politicize the process and limit the ability of 
a governor to directly manipulate the commission. 85 
When the constitution failed to pass, Governor Mandel issued an 
Executive Order, establishing the commission introduced by the 
Convention, composed of the lawyers elected by the bar and lay members 
appointed by the Governor. 86 Since then, each governor has issued a 
similar order.87 As time evolved, so have the orders establishing the 
nominating commissiOns. Today's commission, after years of 
modification, barely resembles the commission proposed by the 
convention and implemented by Mandel. In today's form, the nominating 
committee is comprised of nine lay members and four lawyer members. 88 
The lay members are appointed by the Governor and the lawyer members 
are appointed by the Governor upon recommendation of the local bar 
president. 89 Governors are permitted to modify those committees as they 
see fit. 90 
Prior to the creation of the nominating committee, the Governor had 
free reign in appointing judicial candidates. 91 The design of the original 
commission was for the bar to elect the commission who would 
recommend candidates known to the members of the bar for their 
qualifications, integrity, and ability. 92 Only the most respected lawyers 
would be nominated. Who better to know the qualifications of candidates 
for appointment than their colleagues at the bar? Under the current 
system, with the commission appointed and removable at will by the 
Governor, the commission is a pretense and the Governor essentially has 
free reign in appointing judges. The Governor is able to communicate 
81 Id. at 178 (§ 5.18-.19). 
82 Id. at 178 (§ 5.19). 
83 PROPOSED CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 176 (§ 5.15). 
84 Jd. 
85 See Friedman, supra note 18, at 574. 
86 Exec. Order No. 01.01.1974.23, 2 Md. Reg. 45 (1975). 
87 See Friedman, supra note 18, at 575. 
88 Exec. Order No. 01.01.2008.04, 36 Md. Reg. 954 (2008) (rescinding orders 
01.01.2007.08 and 01.01.2007.11). 
89 Jd. at (C)(2)(a)-(b). 
90 MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 11, § 24 (2003). 
91 See Friedman, supra note 18, at 574-75. 
92 Jd. at 574. 
2009] Selection and Election of Circuit Judges in Maryland 57 
with commission members who are beholden to him for their 
appointment. At best, this gives the appearance of impropriety. 
A nominating committee more comparable to the commission 
intended by the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68, and Mandel's 
Executive Order, would be a more appropriate means to appointing 
qualified judges in an apolitical process. Eliminating the commission 
would be better than retaining the current commission as it currently 
stands. This is the only means to resolving the strongest legitimate 
argument of proponents of judicial elections, which is, that politics 
unfortunately play too large a role in the appointment of circuit judges. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Contested judicial elections for the Circuit Court in Maryland need to 
be abolished. They do not serve the people of the state and do not assure 
that their circuit court judges are the most qualified. They require judges 
to participate in political activities that demean their office. Proponents 
of the current system argue that judges should spend time meeting the 
people, which is something that contested elections facilitate. It is argued 
that this is helpful to the judge as well as to the people whose cases the 
judge will have to decide, because it allows the people to become more 
familiar with the judge, which, in tum, makes the judge's adverse 
decisions more acceptable. Unfortunately, in reality, this is not the case. 
If anything, people resent the fact that the judge comes around, prior to 
the election, pleading for their support, and then disappears for the next 
fifteen years. They do not understand that, after the election, the judge is 
prohibited from participating in the same activities as before. Although 
there certainly is some advantage to the judge learning about the various 
parts of the county and its citizens, the disadvantages of campaigning far 
outweigh any beneficial effect. 
Proponents also argue that contested elections facilitate minority 
representation on the circuit court. As demonstrated above, although that 
argument may have had validity in the past, in the last decade, contested 
elections have had the opposite effect. 93 The truth is that, recently, 
contested elections have prevented qualified minority judges from serving 
on the circuit courts of this state. 
Contested elections require judges to do things that appear improper to 
the informed observer. Moreover, they prevent qualified lawyers from 
seeking a judgeship, while allowing lawyers with questionable 
qualifications to assume the position. To make circuit court judges the 
only judges required to run in contested elections is impractical, 
especially when judges of the courts below and above the circuit court are 
93 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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not subjected to this system. Readers should not be confused by the fact 
that other recommendations were made in this article regarding judicial 
election reform. The one recommendation that is paramount is that 
Maryland do away with this antiquated system of choosing circuit court 
judges in contested elections, where the most adept fundraiser and 
politician is elected to sit in judgment and is authorized to dispense 
justice. If that necessary reform is accomplished, most of the other 
recommendations are moot. Only if contested judicial elections are to 
remain should the other recommendations be considered. 
